[Here’s another paper dug from the dredges of the past. I wrote this two years ago so it might appear rather amateurish. But enjoy…]

Sufism came to West Africa through decentralized individual devotees but has ever since evolved into major social movements. The earliest Sufis in West Africa can be traced back to scholars of Timbuktu, Mali in the 15th century. Organized Sufi turuq only achieved widespread appeal a few centuries afterwards under the Qadiri shaykh, Sidi al-Mukhtar al-Kunti (1729-1811). It then took the form of a militant jihad under Uthman dan Fodio in 1804 foreshadowing the potential of Sufi brotherhoods as a social force to be reckoned with. This jihad was followed by another one led by al-Hajj Umar Tall of the Tijaniyya Sufi order in Segu and Messina. Anti-Sufi movements such as the Salafiyya and Wahhabiyya popular in the Middle East during this time did not catch on amongst the West African population until the period of modernization and anti-colonial struggle in mid-20th century. This paper will discuss main factors for the emergence of an anti-Sufi attitude amongst Muslims in West Africa with particular attention to Senegal and Nigeria in the 20th century. It will be argued that opposition towards Sufis are not due to Sufi practices per se but is instead brought by the changing political and social trend of the time.

Before going into detail, definitions should first be made on what will consistently be referred throughout this paper as Sufism and anti-Sufism. This is important, as will be later discussed, because deceptive semantics has often been used to construct Straw Man fallacies by both the Sufi and anti-Sufi camps in their polemical literature. Sufism has often been stereotyped as an isolationist and irrational way of life alien to Islam. It can also be defined in the broadest sense as Islamic spirituality. However, for the purposes of this discussion, Sufism will refer to Muslim brotherhoods that are led by a highly venerated saint and are engaged in intra-communal practices with distinct prayer rites. They have common doctrines found disagreeable to an anti-Sufi Muslim such as tawassul, mawlid and baraka. The most popular Sufi brotherhoods in West Africa are the Tijaniyya, Muridiyya and Qadiriyya. As for anti-Sufism, this paper identifies three distinct groups: liberalists (or progressives), the Salafiyya and the Wahhabiyya. The reason for making this polarization is because most Muslims in West Africa prior to widespread anti-Sufism would identify themselves with a particular Sufi brotherhood and therefore those who distance themselves from a brotherhood would mean they have adopted an anti-Sufi stance.

As was earlier stated, Sufism in West Africa started with individual figures and gradually grew into large organizations led by a centralized leader called a Caliph. As these brotherhoods grew in number, leadership and control of them was of strategic importance for a person’s or a group’s economic and political interests. In Senegal, the French were worried about the Muridiyya’s economic strength and the Tijaniyya’s anti-colonial motives. To consolidate their position, it is speculated that the French plotted rivalries between marabous of the same brotherhood, such as the rivalry between Seydou Nourou Tall and Ibrahim Niasse. However, self-interest of these leaders also played a role in a bid to win more followers. Furthermore, marabous were led to make public statements of their allegiance with the French colony to either avoid opposition with the French# or to protect their political and economic interests. This development resulted in confusion amongst followers. In the midst of this development, new independent religious leaders emerged to call into question the legitimacy of these representatives. To lend credibility for their anti-colonial stance, these new leaders would need to break the tradition of scholarship by seeking independent views on religious matters since their own leaders had made public declarations of allegiance to the colonial rulers. The colonial tactic of divide and rule became the stepping stone that questioned the need for a corrupted Sufi brotherhood bureaucracy and thus anti-Sufism started gaining popular attention in West Africa.

In the struggle for independence and the subsequent post-colonial era, the major reason for an anti-Sufi attitude amongst certain groups of Muslims was the failure of Sufi brotherhoods to carry out the ideals of Islam as a comprehensive way of life (according to what is defined by the Salafiyya), particularly in the political scene. However, the definition of Islam as a comprehensive way of life by these Salafiyya revivalists is rather problematic to understand. They advocate the notion of following strictly to the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad and bringing about the society as constructed during the time of the Khulafa’ Rashidun. By propagandizing this idealistic reformation, the Salafiyya has effectively skipped centuries of Islamic tradition that has painstakingly transmitted the framework of Islamic scholarship through a sanad. This tradition is what Sufis have hung onto via their concept of an intimate master-disciple relationship, and through tradition, they too claim to bring the ideals of the early pious Muslims. With that cleared, the Salafiyya claim that Sufism, along with other sects, is an innovation from orthodox Islam. Practises of saint veneration were considered inconsistent with strict monotheism.

In the West African context, groups carrying the spirit of the Salafiyya include the Jamaat Izalat al-Bid’a wa Iqamat al-Sunna (Society for the eradication of evil innovation and the establishment of the Sunna) led by Abubakar Gumi (d. 1992) in Northern Nigeria, the Union Culturelle Musulmane (UCM) in Senegal in 1957, and before that, the Subbanu al-Muslimin in Mali and Guinea. This new wave of reform was parallel to successful revivalist movements in North Africa. In the case of the UCM, initial opposition towards Sufism can be more accurately labeled as “anti-maraboutic” rather than anti-Sufism because the UCM collaborated with Prime Minister Mamadou Dia in an effort to usurp the powerful influence of the marabous. The UCM felt discontent that marabous did not use their power to oppose the threats of colonialism and Christianity in corrupting the Muslim generation. However, this trend took a different turn when they lost influence in the government whereas marabous maintained considerable influence in Senegal. Henceforth, the UCM then joined forces with the marabous. The UCM further extolled Amadu Bamba, founder of the Muridiyya, for his anti-colonial resistance. The discontented Cheikh Toure afterwards managed to acquire financial support from the Muridiyya’s Caliph-General to continue his reformation program. The good relationship between reformists and marabous in Senegal continued symbiotically where firstly, reformists extolled al-Hajj Malik Sy and Ibrahim Niasse (both are Tijanis) in addition to Amadu Bamba as heroic Muslims; and secondly, marabous helped disapprove secular President Senghor’s policies. It can thus be suggested here that the cause for Sufi dissension was merely an opportunists’ ploy to gain political support rather than a flaw of Sufism per se.

The situation bears slight resemblance in Nigeria where Sufi leaders have a positive historical reputation for maintaining Islam’s influence against the British in northern Nigeria. Here, the legacy of Qadiri Sufi Usman dan Fodio’s jihad and the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate are still fresh in the memories of Islamic revivalists. The major anti-Sufi individual here, Abubakar Gumi, regarded Usman dan Fodio’s jihad as a driving force for their reform program. However, in 1972, Abubakar Gumi started an attack against Sufism by publishing a book on the importance of Sharia. Typical of the Salafiyya’s simplistic worldview, Abubakar Gumi’s writings gained widespread popularity. Gumi’s mass popularity increased further after his criticism of corruption in the Gowon regime. Amongst his biggest followers are members of Muslim Students’ Society. Another factor that aided Abubakar Gumi is the financial backing of Saudi-based World Muslim League. Though not directly related to anti-Sufism, Gumi gained support from modern educated Muslims (such as graduates of the British-based Kano Law School) through his initiative in encouraging Muslim women to participate in politics. Gumi also argued against pilgrimage during the election year to increase Muslim participation in the elections. This flexibility of interpretation (note this does not mean being tolerant) is another characteristic of the Salafiyya school of thought. The ensuing establishment of the Izala anti-Sufi movement in 1978 was followed by several years of violent clashes with Sufi brotherhoods as the Izala disturbed Sufi brotherhood activities and gained control over Friday mosques. This heated anti-Sufi period died out when Sufi leaders connected the Izala with the Maitatsine riots. A positive outcome of this clash is the unity between the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods. Overall, the most salient factor in attracting people to the Izala anti-Sufi movement here is modernization.

Indeed, these anti-Sufi movements came synchronous with the arrival of modernity in Sub-Saharan society. As most modern criticism of Sufism started from the Wahhabiyya in Najd and is not an intrinsic characteristic of traditional Islam, it only successfully pervaded Sub-Saharan Muslim society during the period of modernization. A possible explanation for the causal relationship between modernity and anti-Sufism is the demand for rational explanations of religious practice and natural phenomena. As such, superstition, mysticism, and saintly miracles did not offer much attraction to the modern-minded person. In addition, modern technology and increased globalization encouraged people to make the pilgrimage to Mekkah, the stronghold of the Wahhabi anti-Sufi movement. Increasing amount of students from Egypt and the Middle-East also sought to bring reforms in other Muslim territories such as the Ikhwanul Muslimin’s penetration into the Sudan. The humanist worldview then encouraged individual exploration of religious knowledge instead of through a master-disciple method. It is an irony here that a group hell-bent on wiping out modern innovations and returning to the era of the early pious generation is in itself a modernist construct.

The anti-Sufi phenomenon in Sub-Saharan Africa is a relatively new development of the mid-20th century and not much has been studied in its internal nuances. However, one salient difference between the Sufi brotherhoods in sub-Saharan Africa as compared to the Middle East is its resilience and still influential social and political role, particularly in Senegal. The possible reasons for this can perhaps be explored in a separate paper. Another aspect of this Sufi and anti-Sufi clash is its effects on the Sufi brotherhoods; one which clearly stands out is the increased cooperation between the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya in Northern Nigeria. In conclusion, the mid-20th century witnessed the emergence of anti-Sufism in the form of Islamic revivalism that employs the Salafiyya school of thought to justify their anti-Sufi arguments. Furthermore, this development was a product of increased modernization in sub-Saharan Muslim societies and is not directly related to an inherent problem of Sufi doctrine per se.

References

Kaba, Lansine. The Wahhabiyya: Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL. 1974.

Westerlund, David. Reaction and Action: Accounting for the Rise of Islamism.

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